Abstract-This paper presents two new theoretical contributions for reasoning under uncertainty: 1) the Total Belief Theorem (TBT) which is a direct generalization of the Total Probability Theorem, and 2) the Generalized Bayes' Theorem drawn from TBT. A constructive justification of Fagin-Halpern belief conditioning formulas proposed in the nineties is also given. We also show how our new approach and formulas work through simple illustrative examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents new theoretical results for reasoning under uncertainty with belief functions (BF) introduced by Shafer in [1] in Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST). The first important result is the Total Belief Theorem (TBT) which is a generalization of the Total Probability Theorem (TPT) for the belief functions framework. From TBT, one can provide a solid justification of Fagin-Halpern (FH) belief conditioning formulas [3] - [5] which are generalizations of the classical conditional probability formulas. These theoretical results allow us to establish rigorously the Generalized Bayes' Theorem (GBT). The belief conditioning problem is challenging, not new, and one of the two main methods usually adopted by users working with BF is : 1) Shafer's belief conditioning method based on Dempster's rule of combination [1] , or 2) the belief conditioning method consistent with imprecise probability calculus bounds [2] , [6] , [7] based on the lower and upper probability interpretation of belief functions popularized by Fagin and Halpern [3] . In this paper we focus on the second approach of belief conditioning because Dempster's rule of combination presents serious problems as reported in [8] - [16] . Smets did also attempt to generalize Bayes' Theorem (BT) and did propose his own GBT [17] on the basis of conditional embedding, conjunctive merging and Shafer's conditioning. Unfortunately, Smets' approach remains doubtful as reported in [18] . Our new GBT establishment is obtained by a direct constructive manner from TBT. It does not need extra assumptions nor some underlying ad-hoc construction principles. Also, we prove that our TBT and GBT presented in this work are fully consistent with classical TPT and BT as soon as the belief functions are Bayesian.
This paper starts with a brief review of very basics of Probability Theory, including the Total Probability Theorem (TPT) and Bayes' Theorem (BT) in Section II because this helps to have a better understanding of the generalizations we propose. A brief review of belief functions is given in Section III, followed by classical Shafer's and Fagin-Halpern's belief conditioning methods respectively in Sections IV and V. In Section VI, we present the decomposition of the set of focal elements of any basic belief assignment (BBA) that allows us to establish formally the TBT and its generalization on Cartesian product space. The Section VII presents and justifies the new belief conditioning formulas drawn from TBT which are fully consistent with Fagin-Halpern conditioning formulas. This section also presents the generalization of Bayes' theorem in the framework of belief functions. We illustrate our new theoretical results with a quite simple GBT example in Section VIII to show how to make derivations of GBT and to prove that Shafer's conditioning results are inconsistent with GBT. Section IX concludes this paper.
II. TOTAL PROBABILITY THEOREM & BAYES' FORMULA

A. Total Probability Theorem
In probability theory, the elements θ i of the space Θ are experimental outcomes. The subsets of Θ are called events and the event {θ i } consisting of the single element θ i is an elementary event. The space Θ is called the sure event and the empty set ∅ is the impossible event. We assign to each event A a number P (A) in [0, 1], called the probability of A, which satisfies the three Kolmogorov's conditions: 1) P (∅) = 0; 2) P (Θ) = 1; and 3) if A ∩ B = {∅}, then P (A ∪ B) = P (A)+P (B). These conditions are the axioms of the theory of probability [20] . The fundamental Theorem of the probability theory is the Total Probability Theorem (TPT), also called a the law of total probability, see [20] which can be stated as follows.
Total Probability Theorem (TPT): Consider an event B and any partition 1 {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A k } of the space Θ. Then
B. Conditional probability and Bayes' formula
Starting from TPT formula (1) and assuming P (B) > 0, we get for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k} after dividing each side of (1) by P (B) and rearranging terms the equality
which allows us to define the conditional probability P (Ai|B) by
Similarly, by considering an event Ai of Θ and the partition {B,B} of Θ, the TPT formula P (Ai) = P (Ai ∩ B) + P (Ai ∩B) applies, and by dividing it by P (Ai) (assuming P (Ai) > 0), one gets
which allows to define the conditional probability P (B|Ai) by
From (3) and (5), one deduces the equality
From equality (6) and assuming P (B) > 0 and P (Ai) > 0, we get
Using (1) and noting that P (Ai ∩ B) = P (B|Ai)P (Ai), we get
Substituting (9) in (7), we obtain Bayes' Theorem (BT) formula stated mathematically as the following equation
One can verify that the conditional probability defined by (3) satisfies the three axioms of the Theory of Probability [20] .
Previously, Ai and B were events (subsets) of the same space Θ. If Ai ⊆ Θ1 and B ⊆ Θ2 with Θ1 = Θ2, which corresponds to a so-called combined experiment [20] , similar conditioning formulas can also be established by working in the Cartesian product space Θ Θ1 × Θ2 whose elementary elements are all the ordered pairs (xp, yq) with xp ∈ Θ1 and yq ∈ Θ2. The two experiments are viewed as a single combined one whose outcomes are pairs (xp, yq). In this space Θ = Θ1 × Θ2, xp is not an elementary element but a subset of n elements of Θ, i.e. {xp} = {(xp, y1), . . . , (xp, yn)}. Similarly, yq is not an elementary element but a subset of m elements of Θ,
Because the event Ai × Θ2 occurs in the combined experiment if the event Ai of the experiment 1 occurs no matter what the outcome of experiment 2 is, one has P (Ai×Θ2) = P1(Ai) where P1(Ai) is the probability of event Ai in the experiment 1. Similarly, the event Θ1 × B occurs if B occurs in experiment 2 no matter what the outcome of experiment 1 is, so that P (Θ1 × B) = P2(B) where P2(B) is the probability of event B in the experiment 2. Considering a partition {A1, A2, . . . , A k } of Θ1 and a subset (event) B ⊆ Θ2, 2 the notation means equal by definition and based on set theory and property of Cartesian product, one can establish also TPT formula
and Bayes' formula
That is why, for notation convenience (and notation abuse), we can just use classical formulas even when working with different sets of experimental outcomes Θ1 and Θ2. One just has to keep in mind that in this case Ai must be understood as Ai × Θ2 and B as Θ1 × B.
III. BASICS OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS
Based on Dempster's works [2] , [19] , Shafer did introduce Belief Functions (BF) to model the epistemic uncertainty 3 and to reason under uncertainty [1] . We consider a finite discrete frame of discernement (FoD) Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θn}, with n > 1, and where all exhaustive and exclusive elements of Θ represent the set of the potential solutions of the problem under concern. The set of all subsets of Θ is the power- 
The set of focal elements of m(·) included in A ⊆ Θ is denoted 
represents the set of focal elements of m(·) which are not subsets of A and not subsets ofĀ Θ − {A} = {X|X ∈ Θ and X / ∈ A}, whereĀ is the complement of A in Θ and the minus symbol denotes the set difference operator.
Belief and plausibility functions are defined by
The width U (A * ) = P l(A) − Bel(A) of the belief interval [Bel(A), P l(A)] is called the uncertainty on A committed by the SoE. It represents the imprecision on the (subjective) probability of A granted by the SoE which provides the BBA m(·). The uncertainty U (A * ) can also be expressed directly as
It is worth noting that U (
where
When all elements of FΘ(m) are only singletons, m(·) is called a Bayesian BBA [1] and its corresponding Bel(·) and P l(·) functions are homogeneous to a same (subjective) probability measure P (·). In this case FA * (m) = FĀ * (m) = ∅. According to Shafer's Theorem 1 below, see [1] page 39 with its proof on page 51, the belief functions can be characterized without referencing to a BBA.
] is a belief function if and only if it satisfies the following conditions:
• B1) Belief in impossible event is zero, that is Bel(∅) = 0.
• B2) Belief in the certain event is one, that is Bel(Θ) = 1.
• B3) For every positive integer n and every collection A1,. . . ,
Quantities m(·) and Bel(·) are one-to-one, and for any
Shafer [1] did propose to combine s ≥ 2 distinct sources of evidence represented by BBAs m1(.), . . . , ms(.) over the same FoD with Dempster's rule (i.e. the normalized conjunctive rule). However Dempster's rule has been strongly disputed from both theoretical and practical standpoints as reported in [16] , [21] , [22] . In particular, the high (or even very low) conflict level between the sources can be totally ignored by Dempster's rule which is a very serious problem [15] . Also, Shafer's conditioning (based on Dempster's rule) is inconsistent with the probabilistic conditioning (see next section). 
IV. SHAFER'S CONDITIONING A. Shafer's conditioning formulas
The expression (21) of Bel(A|B) is equivalent to
because one has always (from definition of belief functions) P l(B) = 1 − Bel(B) and the numerator of (21) can be written as (22)- (23), we get Bel(A|A) = P l(A|A) = 1 which fits with the common sense.
Bel(A ∪B) − Bel(B) = P l(B) − P l(B ∩Ā)
In reversing the roles played by A and B and switching the notations in previous expressions, the following formulas also hold (assuming P l(A) > 0)
From (22) and (25), one deduces that
Hence, the following formula applies for conditional plausibilities when P l(B) > 0
Shafer's formula (25) is similar to conditional probabilities (3) when replacing plausibility by probability. So, at first glance it seems appealing. In the sequel we show why this is not the case.
B. Drawback of Shafer's conditioning
The main drawback of Shafer's conditioning is that the bounds of belief interval [Bel(A|B), P l(A|B)] obtained by (21)- (22) are in general incompatible with lower and upper bounds of the conditional probability P (A|B). This problem makes Shafer's conditioning based on Dempster's rule very disputable and cast doubts on pertinence (validity) of Shafer's conditioning results when used in applications. This serious problem has already been reported and addressed by several authors [3] , [6] , [7] , [11] with some examples. To easily show this incompatibility of of Shafer's conditioning with probability calculus we present briefly the famous Ellsberg urn example [23] .
Example 1 (Ellsberg urn):
We consider an urn with red (R) balls, black (B) and yellow (Y) balls. One knows that 1/3 of balls are red balls and 2/3 or balls are black and yellow balls. So the a priori information about the chance to pick a ball in the urn can be represented by a (parametric) probability mass function P (·)
where x is an unknown number/parameter in [0, 2/3]. Therefore, P (B) and P (Y ) are unknown but their bounds are known. In fact, this problem can be seen as a problem of imprecise probabilities where P (R) + P (B) + P (Y ) = 1 with
Now let's suppose that someone picks a ball at random in the urn and tell us that the color of the ball is not black, i.e. the event B = R ∪ Y has occurred. How do we must revise (update) our prior probabilities with this new information? The correct answer to this question is obtained by computing the conditional probabilities P (R|B), P (B|B) and P (Y |B) and by analyzing their bounds. This is done using the fact that
because the events R and Y are mutually exclusive. So, we get
If x = 0, then P (R|B) = 1 and P (Y |B) = 0. If x = 2/3, then P (R|B) = 1/3 and P (Y |B) = 2/3. Therefore after conditioning we get 
. With Shafer's conditioning formulas and noting that P l(R) = 1/3, P l(B) = 2/3, P l(Y ) = 2/3, and P l(R ∪ Y ) = 1, we get
Hence with Shafer's conditioning we get results incompatible with the real bounds of conditional probabilities because
V. FAGIN-HALPERN CONDITIONING Fagin and Halpern (FH) proposed in [3] , [4] to define the conditional belief as the lower envelope (i.e. the infimum) of a family of conditional probability functions to make belief conditioning consistent with imprecise conditional probability calculus.
A. Fagin-Halpern conditioning formulas
Assuming Bel(B) > 0, Fagin and Halpern proposed the following conditional formulas (FH formulas for short)
They prove in [3] that Bel(A|B) given by (27) satisfies the three conditions of Theorem 1 and so FH belief conditioning is an appealing solution for BF conditioning. However, it is quite obscure how Fagin and Halpern did obtain (construct) FH formulas. A justification has been given by Sundberg and Wagner in [7] (p. 268) but it is not very easy to follow. In this paper, we justify clearly and directly the establishment of FH formulas from the simple and direct consequence of the Total Belief Theorem (TBT).
Similarly, by switching notations and assuming Bel(A) > 0, the previous FH formulas can be rewritten as
As we see, FH formulas are also consistent with Bayes' formula when the underlying BBA m(·) is Bayesian. Indeed if m(·) is Bayesian, then P l(A∩B) = Bel(A∩B) = P (A∩B), P l(Ā∩B) = Bel(Ā∩B) = P (Ā∩B) and P l(B ∩A) = Bel(B ∩A) = P (B ∩A) and FH formulas become equivalent to Bel(A|B) = P l(A|B) = P (A∩B)/(P (A∩B)+P (Ā∩B)) (31)
Thanks to TPT formula (1), the denominator involved in these formula is P (A ∩ B) + P (Ā ∩ B) = P (B), therefore
Similarly, one can also easily verify that
B. Advantage of Fagin-Halpern conditioning
The advantage of FH conditioning is its complete compatibility with the conditional probability calculus [7] , [25] . We show what provides FH conditioning in the previous Ellsberg urn example.
Ellsberg urn example revisited: Applying FH conditioning formulas with the conditioning eventB = R ∪ Y we obtain
Similarly, we can verify that Bel(B|B) = 0, P l(B|B) = 0, Bel(Y |B) = 0 and P l(Y |B) = 2/3. Therefore with these conditioning formulas, we get the correct bounds of the imprecise conditional probabilities 
VI. TOTAL BELIEF THEOREM (TBT)
In this section, we extend TPT theorem to BF and we establish the Total Belief Theorem (TBT) based on a decomposition of FΘ(m).
A. Decomposition of F Θ (m)
Let us consider a FoD Θ = {θ1, . . . , θ |Θ| } with |Θ| > 1 elements, and a BBA m(·) defined on 2 Θ with a given set of focal elements FΘ(m). Considering any partition {A1, A2, . . . , A k } of the FoD Θ, then FΘ(m) can be obtained by the union of following subsets
where 
The entity A * has in general no explicit form and it is used only for notation convenience and conciseness. Because Ai for i = 1, . . . , k are mutually exclusive (disjoint), the sets 
Example 2: Consider Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5} and a BBA m(·) defined on 2 Θ , with set of focal elements FΘ(m) = {X1, X2, . . . , X8} chosen as follows: X1 = θ1, X2 = θ1 ∪ θ2, X3 = θ2 ∪ θ3, X4 = θ3 ∪ θ4, X5 = θ4, X6 = θ4 ∪ θ5, X7 = θ1 ∪ θ3 ∪ θ5, and X8 = θ5. Consider also the partition {A1, A2, A3} of Θ with A1 = {θ1, θ2}, A2 = {θ3, θ4} and A3 = {θ5}. Therefore,
Applying (36), one gets
B. Total Belief Theorem (TBT)
Based on the previous decomposition of FΘ(m) according to any partition {A1, . . . , A k } of the FoD Θ, the following TBT holds. 
Total Belief Theorem (TBT): Let's consider a FoD Θ with |Θ| ≥ 2 elements and a BBA m(·) defined on 2 Θ with the set of focal elements FΘ(m). For any chosen partition {A1, . . . , A k } of Θ and for any B ⊆ Θ, one has
Bel(B) = i=1,...,k Bel(Ai ∩ B) + U (A * ∩ B)(37)
. , k). Note that if B = Θ and if the FoD Θ is simply partitioned as
{A A1,Ā A2}, then U (A * ∩B) = U (A * ∩Θ) = U (A * ) = P l(A) − Bel(A) = P l(Ā) − Bel(Ā).
Corollary 1 of TBT: If m(·)
is Bayesian, then TBT is consistent with the Total Probability Theorem (TPT) because U (A * ∩ B) = 0 and Bel(·) is homogeneous to a probability measure.
In expressing Bel(B) with TBT and noting that P l(B) = 1 − Bel(B), one can also easily establish the following (not so elegant) Total Plausibility Theorem (TPlT).
Total Plausibility Theorem (TPlT): For any partition {A1, . . . , A k } of Θ and any B ⊆ Θ, one has
C. Example for TBT
Consider the FoD Θ = {θi, i = 1, . . . , 7} and FΘ(m) = {X1, X2, . . . , X9} of a BBA m(·) defined over 2 Θ as in Table I . Consider also the partition {A1, A2, A3} of Θ with A1 θ1 ∪ θ3 ∪ θ4∪θ7, A2 θ2∪θ5 and A3 θ6 and the subset B = θ4∪θ5∪θ6∪θ7 of Θ. The Table II summarizes the belief values of different subsets of Θ which are needed to apply TBT.
m(X 7 ) = 0.20
m(X 9 ) = 0.05 Table I FOCAL ELEMENTS AND THEIR MASSES.
Subsets of
Bel(B) = 0.39
Bel(A 1 ) = 0.04
Bel(A 2 ) = 0.20
Bel(A 3 ) = 0.05
Bel(A 3 ∩ B) = 0.05 Table II  BELIEF Therefore, one has
In applying TBT formula (37), one can easily verify 
Bel(B ∩
Ai
D. Generalization of TBT
As explained in Section II-B, we have to work in Cartesian product space Θ = Θ1 × Θ2 if the partition {A1, . . . , A k } is related to a given FoD Θ1 and B is a subset of an other FoD Θ2. Because {A1, . . . , A k } is a partition of Θ1, then {A1 × Θ2, . . . , A k × Θ2} defines a partition of Θ = Θ1 × Θ2 and because
, one can always apply TBT in the Cartesian space Θ. More precisely, one has
and where
). This formula can be used if and only if one knows the joint BBA m(·) (or equivalently the joint belief) defined over the powerset of the Cartesian space Θ = Θ1 × Θ2. Fusion (FUSION) 
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VII. CONDITIONAL BELIEF FUNCTIONS AND GBT
Before justifying FH conditioning from TBT and presenting the Generalized Bayes' Theorem for BF, we establish a useful lemma.
Lemma 1: Consider a FoD Θ with a given BBA m(·) defined over Θ, for partition {Ai,Āi} of Θ and any B ⊆ Θ, one always has
A. Conditional belief and plausibility
We consider a partition {Ai,Āi} of the FoD Θ and a subset B of Θ. Using TBT, one has
Hence
Moreover, since one has (by definition)
from the equality (44), one gets
Putting the expression of Bel(Āi ∩ B) above into (43) and rearranging terms, one gets
Assuming Bel(B) > 0, and dividing left and right sides of the equality (46) by Bel(B) + Δ(U ), one gets
Hence, the equality (47) suggests to define the conditional belief Bel(Ai|B) and P l(Āi|B) as follows
Using equality (46), the previous conditioning formulas can be rewritten more concisely as
ReplacingĀi by Ai in notations of formulas (49)- (51) we get 6 the following expressions for conditional plausibility P l(Ai|B)
Formulas (50) and (53) coincide with FH formulas [4] originally proposed from a very good intuition. In this work, we derive them only from TBT by a direct constructive manner. Note that 6 It is worth to note that one has always U (A * ∩ B) = (50) is a belief function one must also prove that it is an nmonotone (n ≥ 2) Choquet's capacity [24] on the finite set Θ, or equivalently that the condition B3 of Theorem 1 holds for Bel(·|B). The proof of B3 is difficult, but three different proofs have been already given by Fagin and Halpern [3] , Jaffray [6] , and Sundberg and Wagner [7] , the latter one being the clearest of fashion.
Bel(Ai|B
) given in (48) satisfies Bel(∅|B) = 0, Bel(Θ|B) = 1, and Bel(Ai|B) ∈ [0, 1] conditions. To prove that Bel(Ai|B) defined by
B. Generalization of Bayes' Theorem
Starting from (48) with Δ(U ) U ((Āi ∩ B) * ) − U (A * ∩ B) and replacing Bel(B) by the expression (37) of TBT, we get
Similarly, in assuming Bel(Ai) > 0, Fagin-Halpern expression of Bel(B|Ai) given by
is equivalent to the formula
with
, and where
FB * (m) = FΘ(m) − FB(m) − FB(m).
From (56), one obtains
Replacing the above expression of Bel(Ai ∩ B) into the formula (54), we obtain the formula
where the factor q(Ai, B) introduced here for notation conciseness is defined by
This allows to establish the Generalized Bayes' Theorem (GBT). 
, and where the factor q(Ai, B) is defined by (61).
Lemma 2: GBT reduces to BT if Bel(·) is a Bayesian BF.
Proof: See appendix.
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Remark: When Ai ⊆ Θ1 and B ⊆ Θ2 with Θ1 = Θ2, we must work in the Cartesian product space Θ = Θ1 × Θ2 and the GBT formula is similar to (62) in replacing Ai by Ai × Θ2, and B by Θ1 × B. The application of GBT formula is not easy in general because it requires the knowledge of joint BBA m(·) defined over 2 Θ 1 ×Θ 2 which is rarely known in practice. If the joint BBA m(·) can be expressed (or approximated) as a function of two marginal BBAs m1(·) and m2(·) (assumed to be known) defined respectively over Θ1 and Θ2, then GBT formula should become tractable.
VIII. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF GBT
Consider Θ = {θi, i = 1, . . . , 7}, FΘ(m) = {X1, X2, . . . , X9} and m(·) given in Table III .
m(X 9 ) = 0.05 Table III  FOCAL 
Bel(B) = 0.39 P l(B) = 0.80
Bel(X) = 0.04
Bel(X) = 0.05
Bel(X) = 0.39
Bel(X) = 0.04 P l(X) = 0.75 • Results with Fagin-Halpern conditioning formulas Using (50) and (55) and the fact that P l(Ai|B) = 1− Bel(Āi|B) and P l(B|Ai) = 1 − Bel(B|Ai), we get the values of Tables V-VI. One verifies that GBT formula (62) works because we retrieve correct values obtained with FH formula. Indeed, one has
Similarly, one can easily verify that one obtains Bel(A2|B) = 0 and Bel(A3|B) ≈ 0.0625 with GBT.
• Results with Shafer's conditioning formulas With formulas (22)- (23), we get the values of Tables VIII-IX. One sees that the conditional values are not coherent since they do not verify GBT because we obtain in this example Bel(A1|B) = 0.3250 (using (23))
Similarly, one can show that Bel(A2|B) = 0 (using (23)) = 0.0405 (using GBT) and Bel(A3|B) = 0.0625 (using (23)) = 0.0504 (using GBT). Hence, Ellsberg urn example and this example show clearly that Dempster's rule of combination used by Shafer to establish his belief conditioning formulas does not provide coherent and satisfactory results since they are inconsistent with lower and upper bounds of imprecise conditional probabilities and they do not satisfy GBT established directly by a constructive manner without ad-hoc assumption. 
B. Proof of Lemma 1
For notation convenience, we denote This coincides with formula (10) since Bel(·) (being a Bayesian belief function) is homogeneous to a probability measure P (·). This completes the proof that GBT formula is consistent with Bayes' Theorem formula when the Belief function is Bayesian.
Δ(U ) U ((Āi
∩
